Evidence on the relationship between political contributions and legislators' voting behavior is marred by concerns about endogeneity in the estimation process. Using a legislator's offspring sex mix as a truly exogenous variable, we employ an instrumental variable estimation procedure to predict the effect of voting behavior on political contributions. Following previous research, we find that a legislator's proportion daughters has a significant effect on voting behavior for women's issues, as measured by score in the ''Congressional Record on Choice'' issued by NARAL Pro-Choice America. In the second stage, we make a unique contribution by demonstrating a significant impact of exogenous voting behavior on PAC contributions, lending further credibility to the hypothesis that Political Action Committees respond to legislators' voting patterns by ''rewarding'' political candidates that vote in line with the positions of the PAC, rather than affecting those same votes -at least in this high-profile policy domain.
Introduction
The relationship between Congressional voting behavior and political contributions remains a continuing puzzle for social scientists interested in the American political process. We know that there is a high correlation between how legislators vote and how they are rated by interested Political Action Committees (PACs) on the one hand, and the amount of donations that legislators receive from these lobbyist groups, on the other. The data from NARAL Pro-Choice America used in this paper, for instance, underscore the high correlation between PAC contributions in a given election cycle and voting scores assigned by the organization for the previous Congressional session.
However, though of critical importance to understanding the role of money in the lawmaking process, sorting out causal directionality here is extremely difficult methodologically. To what extent do contributions from PACs actually influence the voting patterns of elected officials -a particularly worrisome dynamic from the point of view of those concerned with influence peddling? Or, conversely, to what extent do the voting record and ideological commitments of an elected official influence his or her PAC contributions -a ''rewards'' based system of political patronage that may still be troubling to those concerned with the influence of money on democracy, but which is less blatantly a bribery system?
The scale of contributions made by Political Action Committees to Congressional candidates raises the salience of the issue for social scientists concerned about the influence of money in our political process. According to the non-partisan, non-profit Center for Responsive Politics, which compiles, tracks and publicizes political donations, approximately 40% of 0049-089X/$ -see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.09.005 1 Recognizing the magnitude of PAC contributions, this paper examines the extent to which these contributions are used as ''rewards'' for legislators that support PAC position. We focus on PAC donations since such campaign contributions are explicitly linked to a legislative agenda; in the conclusion, we discuss the generalizability of this sector to political donations more generally (i.e. from private individuals, corporations, unions and other donor groups). While previous research provides evidence for this rewards-based system, we focus on quantifying the impact of political donations in a highly-visible, ideological domain -reproductive rights. Our central contribution is the employment of an instrumental variable approach to measure the ''rewards''-based system. This unique estimation strategy uses a truly exogenous variable -the proportion of a legislator's children that are female -as an instrument to predict voting behavior, offering an improvement over instruments used in previous IV regression models.
Background
An extensive body of literature in political science and political sociology explores strategies used by Political Action Committees to distribute contributions to political candidates (e.g. Clawson and Neustadtl, 1989; Gopoian, 1984) . The majority of research on this subject examines the hypothesis that financial contributions from Political Action Committees influence the voting decisions of members of Congress (see Grenzke, 1989a,b; Ansolabehere et al., 2003) . Yet, determining the direction of causality between political contributions and voting behavior remains elusive. The search for causality is hindered by methodological concerns, as well as the recognition that strategies for distributing political contributions are likely to differ by issue, with ideological, politically-charged issues (like reproductive rights) more susceptible to a rewards-based system.
One theory of political donations suggests that over and above other important factors such as party affiliation (Stratmann, 1996; Rudolph, 1999) , seniority (Grenzke, 1989a) , committee assignments Munger, 1993, 1991; Evans, 1988) and other legislator characteristics, ideological 'fence-sitters' should elicit the greatest financial support in a 'bidding war' of sorts for their swing votes on important issues. In terms of individual legislator characteristics, this theory predicts that moderates, rather than committed liberals or conservatives, are most susceptible to influence peddling from PACs. From his work on defense PACs, Fleisher (1993) concludes that his results ''indicate that contributions from defense PACs can under certain circumstances marginally influence the votes of members, especially those members with weaker ideological predispositions.'' (Fleisher, 1993: 406) Those without clear, consistent policy positions are viewed as most swayable, and political contributions are aimed at influencing these legislators' voting behavior.
Yet, other recent empirical evidence suggests the opposite -that a consistent ideological position is associated with high campaign contributions. In a recent NBER working paper, Kroszner and Stratmann (2000) find that a clear, well-known ideological position increases campaign contributions. Using the percent of repeat givers as a proxy for a legislator's reputational development, Kroszner and Stratmann (2000) report that ''high reputational development is rewarded with high total contributions.'' (Kroszner and Stratmann, 2000: 25) In this analysis, legislators profit as they build their reputational clarity, as political contributors invest in legislators who will provide 'sure' returns based on prior patterns.
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Net of individual legislator characteristics, the literature suggests that PACs should be most influential in swaying voting behavior for low profile, non-ideological issues. Fleisher (1993) tests the effect of political contributions from organizations involved in the national defense industry. Using a two-stage least squares estimation procedure to overcome the simultaneity of defense PAC donations and voting behavior, Fleischer predicts PAC contributions using characteristics of individual legislators and their districts in his model, including a legislator's campaign receipts from other PACs. In the second stage, this instrumented variable for defense PAC contributions is used to predict support for defense legislation in the 100th Congress. While finding a significant impact of ideology on voting behavior, Fleisher also finds a significant effect of defense PAC contributions, although the magnitude of this effect is small. Unfortunately, the variables Fleisher claims to be exogenous in the first-stage (e.g. ideology, contracts received from the Defense Department, party, etc.) in predicting defense PAC contributions do not meet the exclusion restriction; in other words, we should expect all those factors to affect voting on defense issues independent of donations.
Likewise, Grenzke (1989b) finds that political contributions are unlikely to change voting behavior, even for low profile, niche issues. In the first stage, Grenzke predicts PAC contributions from a host of variables, including electoral vulnerability and member's power (Grenzke, 1989b: 8) . Grenzke then lags the effect of political contributions by using contributions in both the simultaneous year and the preceding year to when the behavior was measured. In other words, for voting during the 95th Congress (1977 Congress ( -1978 , Grenzke uses both contributions during the 1977-1978 election cycle, as well as during the 1975-1976 election cycle. Of 29 models, Grenzke finds only four significant associations in the simultaneous relationship and one significant association in the lagged relationship. As a result, Grenzke concludes that ''contributions from 120 PACs affiliated with 10 large interest groups generally do not maintain or change House members' voting patterns.'' (Grenzke, 1989b: 19) As with Fleisher's study, Grenzke's instrument (electoral vulnerability) fails the second-stage exclusion restriction, as we would expect variables like electoral vulnerability to affect both PAC contributions (if more vulnerable incumbents are on the prowl for money) and voting behavior (if electoral vulnerability makes incumbents more likely to vote in ways appealing to particular constituencies that may, for example, stimulate job growth in their districts).
Of course, Political Action Committees may influence legislative outcomes through channels other than voting behavior. They may shape bills earlier in the legislative process, or halt legislation before it makes it to a vote. In the House of Representatives, for instance, where much of the legislative work is performed in committee, committee assignments are significant predictors of campaign contributions; in the Senate, on the other hand, party affiliation plays a more significant role in determining contributions. Witko (2006) builds on this analysis by arguing that the ''issue context'' matters. Using probit analysis to measure the effect of PAC contributions on ideological, visible issues versus non-ideological, non-visible issues, he argues that contributions influence voting behavior on non-visible issues, but influence measures of participation on more visible ones. These measures of participation include the number of times a legislator participates in a committee hearing, the number of amendments submitted by legislators, and the number of lines of text added by legislators to hearing transcripts. Thus, Witko challenges the traditional explanation that PAC contributions matter for non-ideological, non-visible issues. He argues instead that, for visible, ideological issues, PAC contributions matter earlier in the legislative process, when legislators are participating in committee hearings and offering legislative amendments (Witko, 2006: 289) . This analysis leads to a more nuanced understanding of the impact of campaign contributions on political behavior by suggesting that researchers must examine committee participation, as well as actual voting behavior.
While Witko (2006) offers an alternative to the money-votes linkage by suggesting that political contributions are linked with other forms of legislator participation, recent experimental evidence on the relationship between contributions and access suggests otherwise. Chin (2005) conducted an experiment in which Congressional schedulers were given a set of hypothetical schedule requests, along with a weekly schedule for a member of Congress. These staff members are asked to schedule the member of Congress, based on the set of letters and requests available to the scheduler. Using a variety of experimental conditions, Chin (2005) concludes that it is constituency status, rather than campaign contribution history, that significantly affects the likelihood of a scheduling request being accepted. While this experimental study may be of limited external validity due to the hypothetical nature of the research, it does suggest that political contributions may not be paramount in gaining access to legislators.
In another effort to get at the heart of the relationship between voting behavior and political contributions, Bronars and Lott (1997) examine the voting behavior of retiring members of Congress in their final term in Congress. If the need for campaign donations to secure reelection impacts legislative behavior, then the decision to retire -and subsequently stop receiving political contributions -should change the voting behavior of members by freeing them from such considerations to instead purely vote their conscience. They find no evidence for this hypothesis, thereby calling into dispute the notion that political contributions affect voting behavior. However, it could be the case that PACs have already 'trapped' retiring legislators into a path-dependent voting record that conditions votes during that member's final Congressional term; or that the retiring member is responsive to the same lobbying forces but this time with the carrot of a lucrative position in the private sector post-retirement; or that the member is voting to maximize donations to his/her anointed successor in an implicit bargain.
Despite widespread attempts to model the influence of PACs on political behavior and legislative outcomes, few studies have focused on the policy domain of reproductive rights; in fact, in an extensive review of the topic, Ansolabehere et al. (2003) do not report a single article in this domain. Still, scholars studying the politics of reproductive rights have examined the impact of constituency characteristics on legislators' policy positions (Highton and Rocca, 2005) , the impact of public opinion on abortion policy (Jelen and Wilcox, 2003; Norrander and Wilcox, 1999) and candidate choice (Abramowitz, 1995) , and the effect of changing party positions on public opinion (Adams, 1997) . We offer an extension of this scholarship by linking donations from choice-related PACs with legislative behavior (see Shin, 2004; Thomas, 1994) . Although Shin (2004) studies the impact of constituency characteristics on distribution decisions by NARAL, her inclusion of an uninstrumented variable for voting behavior fails to account for the simultaneity of voting behavior and political contributions -the central contribution of our research.
Across policy domains, the evidence presented thus far -both from experimental research examining the relationship between money and access, as well as the quantitative research linking political donations to voting behavior -may allay the fears of those concerned with the 'buying' of votes through campaign donations by Political Action Committees. If the causal relationship between donations and voting is weak, we should expect that the 'residual' impact of voting on donations is strong to account for the high overall correlation. With this expectation in mind, the present study tries to quantify the extent to which voting patterns of a legislator during a given Congress affects the donations of a particular PAC to that member in the subsequent election cycle. Of course, merely deploying temporal ordering does not satisfy the condition of strict (or even weak) exogeneity in a time series analysis. For example, it could be that members of Congress vote a certain way in anticipation of (i.e. fishing for) donations from a PAC (or perhaps as a result of explicit or implicit promises). Clearly, such a dynamic would be troubling from the point of view of the democratic process just as much as simultaneous exchange of money for votes or prior donations driving future votes.
To preempt this issue, we employ a unique estimation strategy: We use exogenous variation in the sex mix of legislators' children to predict their voting patterns on certain issues. Sex mix has been used as an instrument for parental labor force participation (Angrist and Evans, 1998) , for parental divorce (Dahl and Moretti, 2004) , and for parental investment in offspring (Conley and Glauber, 2006) . The appeal of this instrument lies in its random assignment in a country -like the US -where there is little to no antenatal sex selection (i.e. sex selective abortion). Although instrumental variables have been previously used in research on donations and voting behavior (e.g. Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Grenzke, 1989a,b; Fleisher, 1993) , our instrument better meets the exclusion restriction required for an IV-regression. This utilization of the random variation provided by the sex-mix of offspring to predict voting patterns becomes the first stage in an IV-regression of lagged voting on political contributions, thereby providing us with a 'clean' estimate of the impact of voting on donation. Specifically, we follow Washington (2008) who shows that Congressmen who have more daughters -conditional on number of total children -tend to vote in a way that receives higher ratings from women's issues PACs, such as the National Organization for Women (NOW), and lower ratings from pro-life PACs, like Right to Life. Her results hold for legislators from both parties-though, of course, Democrats receive higher average scores. She interprets this result as a 'socialization effect' -that is, daughters, she argues, influence the thinking of their parents. However, it is equally possible, we believe, that her finding results from a shift in the legislator's own interests. If a legislator does not have a daughter, then s/he may care less about policies to better the lives and opportunities of women than someone who has a daughter, ceritus parabus. Put more starkly, if a legislator does not have a teenage daughter who may become pregnant, s/he may not be as personally impacted by, for example, abortion restrictions. For our analysis, the reason(s) for the effect are not important as long as they meet the exclusion restriction for our second stage. Namely, there can be no indirect effect (i.e. not reflected in their voting record and rating of that record by the PAC) of the sex mix of legislators' offspring on the donations they receive from a given PAC. This boils down to the assumption that PACs do not intentionally or unintentionally give more donations to legislators with daughters, net of their evaluations of those legislators. This seems like a reasonable assumption. If there were subtle bias in PAC behavior thanks to the composition of the legislator's family, we would likely see it in the overall rating of that legislator, too, and not just in the donation amounts. This assumption falls apart to the extent that ratings are made very unalterable algorithms and donations are made by more flexible, 'softer' criteria. Even if this difference in PAC decision making processes exists at these two decision points, it is still unlikely to reflect bias induced by the sex mix of children to any significant degree.
Another way that the exclusion restriction might be violated would be if the presence of daughters makes the legislators more or less powerful in Congress in ways that are independent of their actual votes. For example, conditional on how many children a member of Congress has, the proportion of daughters may influence how well liked s/he is in her/his home district; or partisanship 4 ; or it may affect committee assignment, leadership roles, or tenure -all factors that have been shown to be associated with donation levels. While it may be easy to come up with reasons why the number of children a legislator has could affect their Congressional careers in any number of ways, it is much more difficult to suggest that the proportion of daughters does. One possible problem is that having two same sex children among the first two born has been shown to influence whether or not parents go on to have additional children (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Conley and Glauber, 2006) . However, our key indicator is not ''same sex'' but rather proportion girls; furthermore, the fact that the impact of each additional daughter appears linear and works for legislators with two children or with three, the idea that the presence of two daughters is driving PAC score through fertility should be allayed.
Data and methods
We estimate the effect of voting behavior on contributions from Political Action Committees using a two-stage least squares approach. As previous research finds that the proportion daughters for federal legislators is a significant predictor of voting behavior for women's issues (Washington, 2008) , we limit our analysis to issues identified by NARAL Pro-Choice America in the annual ''Congressional Record on Choice.'' The focus on NARAL is consistent with previous research examining Political Action Committees in the domain of reproductive rights (Shin, 2004) . NARAL Pro-Choice America is one of the largest organizations advocating for a woman's right to choose. In 2006, the organization distributed over $540,000 to federal political candidates -nearly five times the amount given by Planned Parenthood or the National Organization for Women. The organization lobbies on women's issues, including birth control, abortion, and sex education, and also rates legislators, based on their voting patterns for an aggregate set of bills tracked by the organization.
For the present project, we compiled an extensive dataset for members of the United States House of Representatives from the 105th Congress (1997 Congress ( -1998 through the 108th Congress (2003 Congress ( -2004 . Using a dataset originally compiled by Washington (2008) that included proportion daughters, age, and religion of each member of the House of Representatives, we expanded the dataset to include PAC contributions from NARAL Pro-Choice America for each election cycle from 1998 to 2006, as well as scores from NARAL Pro-Choice America from 1997 through 2004.
3 In Washington's data, the association between proportion daughters and NOW score is positive for both male and female legislators. However, only for male legislators is the association statistically significant, and the magnitude of the association is greater for men than for women (see Washington, 2008 ,  Table 3 ). 4 In running descriptive statistics for legislators of both parties, we find that the proportion daughters differs by political party, and the difference -in which
Republicans have a lower proportion daughters -is significant at the .05 level. The mean proportion daughters for Republicans is 0.49 and for Democrats is 0.53. A t-test for the difference in means suggests that we can reject the null hypothesis at the .05 level. This may suggest that proportion daughters influences party affiliation (though it also may be a chance finding given the number of observables we tested and the small, substantive magnitude of the difference); nonetheless, we control for party ID in our analysis.
In our sample of legislators, the mean representative is 55 years old and has 2.45 children. Of the 1740 person-year observations in our dataset, four observations are missing data on the number of children.
5 Another 225 observations are legislators without children, and these legislators are therefore excluded from our analysis. As a result, we limit our analysis to the 1511 observations in which legislators have children, and we have accurate data about the sex mix of those children. Of this sample of legislators with children, the mean proportion of daughters is 0.51. We report descriptive statistics on this sample in Table 1 . In the first stage of each analysis (outlined below), we use scores assigned by NARAL as the dependent variable. NARAL scores legislators on a scale of 0-100 based on a composite of votes each year, and these scores are published in NARAL's annual ''Congressional Record on Choice.'' A legislator receiving a score of 100 voted in concurrence with the NARAL position on each of the Congressional votes for that year; a legislator receiving a score of 0 voted the opposite of the position supported by NARAL on each piece of legislation. The number of votes used in the annual composite varies by year, with as few as two votes in 2004 to nineteen votes in 1997. In a typical year, the ''Congressional Record on Choice'' includes votes on issues like the ''Partial Birth'' Abortion Ban; an amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization Act forbidding military personnel from obtaining privately-funded abortions at overseas military hospitals; an amendment to the Agricultural Appropriations banning the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from testing drugs for early, non-surgical abortions; the denial of US family planning assistance abroad to non-governmental organizations that use private funds to provide abortions; and an amendment to the Labor, Health and Human Services Appropriations banning the prescription of emergency contraception pills at school-based health centers. 6 We transformed annual scores for legislators into a score for each legislator in each Congress by averaging a legislator's score across the 2-year period for that Congress. For example, if a legislator received a score of 80 for the year 1997 and 90 for the year 1998, we averaged that legislator's score to give him/her a NARAL score of 85 for the 105th Congress. In Table 2 , we provide the frequency of scores for legislators in each Congress. As the table suggests, the majority of legislators scored either a 0 or 100 in each Congress, although there is significant variation across the range of scores. Given this distribution, we present two IV regressions in which the NARAL score is dichotomized, in addition to presenting a regression on a linear raw score. In the first, we use a dichotomous outcome that compares observations that score zero versus all other observations; in the second, our dichotomous outcome compares observations that score 100 versus all other observations. The mean NARAL score varied significantly by political party, with the average Democrat receiving a NARAL score of 76, while the average Republican received a NARAL score of 11.
Information on political contributions for each person-year from NARAL Pro-Choice America was compiled from the Center for Responsive Politics on their website, www.opensecrets.org. In the four election cycles considered in this paper (and, thus, 1740 person-years), 1457 observations -or approximately 84% -received no money from NARAL Pro-Choice America. Table 3 illustrates the frequency distribution, by $1000 contributions. Thus, we show results for a continuous measure of money received as well as a dichotomous indicator as to whether the observation received any donations whatsoever from NARAL. The maximum donation recorded was $10,000, and it appears in thirteen cases in our data. The mean contribution per person-year is $396.87, although this varies by political party, as well. The average Democrat received $765.48 from NARAL, whereas the mean Republican received $59.10. In fact, only five Republicans received donations from NARAL Pro-Choice America during the time period covered, accounting for 11 unique observations in our dataset.
7 Of the observations for Democrats in our dataset, there are 270 cases -or 32.45% of observations for Democrats -in which members received contributions from NARAL. We begin by using a ''naïve'' ordinary least squares analysis to predict whether a legislator was the recipient of donations from NARAL Pro-Choice America. In this model (and all subsequent ones), we have accounted for the fact that a legislator's score is likely to affect political contributions in the subsequent election cycle by lagging our measure of PAC contributions. We match donations in an election cycle with the score received by a legislator during the preceding Congress. For example, we predict PAC donations in the 1998 election cycle using a legislator's NARAL Pro-Choice America score for the years 1997-1998 (105th Congress). The temporal ordering of this estimation technique logically suggests that voting behavior in the 105th Congress has an effect on the political contributions received in the campaign for the subsequent (106th) Congress. However, the naïve regression assumes that a legislator's score is independent of the likelihood of receiving a contribution from NARAL Pro-Choice America, and is therefore treated as an exogenous independent variable in the regression analysis. Although the theoretical literature gives us ample reason to dismiss this assumption, the naïve model enables comparison with the instrumented model. In this linear probability model, we control for individual legislator characteristics, including party affiliation, age and religious affiliation. This model is shown as equation one, below. The following is a list of Republic members receiving NARAL contributions, and the number of election cycles during which they received contributions:
Constance Morella (R-MD) -3; Benjamin Gilman (R-NY) -1; Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY) -2; Nancy Johnson (R-CT) -3; Rob Simmons (R-CT) -2. 8 A logistic regression model yields similar estimates. We prefer the LPM since Heckman and Macurdy (1985) and others have persuasively argued that in an IV-or 2SLS-regression with a dichotomous Y, a linear probability estimation is most consistent.
where Y is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a legislator received money from NARAL; AGE is the legislator's age; DEMOCRAT is a dummy variable for party affiliation; CHRISTIAN, CATHOLIC, and OTHER_RELIGION are three dummy variables for religion (with Protestant excluded as the reference category)
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; and NARALSCORE is the legislator's NARAL score as observed (or the associated dichotomous measure).
We then compare this approach to results from an instrumental variable regression approach. The first stage predicts NARAL score using the same set of controls, along with a variable, PROPDAUGHT (proportion daughters of total children). This first stage model is shown as equation two below.
Our second stage regression (LPM) estimates the impact of this instrumented NARALSCORE Ã on the likelihood of receiving a donation from NARAL for each legislator in the subsequent election cycle.
10 This second stage model is shown as equation
Results
As a baseline for comparison, first we estimate an ordinary least squares linear probability model of the likelihood of NARAL donation in a given election cycle based on NARAL score for the previous Congress-using only time ordering as a claim on exogeneity. We present the results of our naïve regression in Table 4 . While we dismiss these results out of hand because of concerns about endogeneity previous discussed, the presentation of the naïve results allow researchers to compare the two-stage least squares estimation with the ordinary least squares regression to see how the latter may 9 Christian is admittedly a strange formulation given we have Catholic and Protestant; however, this is meant to be other or non-specified Christian religion.
We inherited this formulation from Washington (2008) and seek to reproduce her models and thus retain it. However, we did also test models with other specifications-for example, adding an indicator variable for Jewish religion-and results were not sensitive to such alternative formulations. 10 We have run additional analysis (not included) of IV-regressions broken down by various demographic and political variables in our sample, including sex, region, political party and age in an effort to determine whether there are heterogeneous treatment effects. These results are available from the authors upon request.
misrepresent the magnitude of the effect of a legislator's NARAL score on the probability of receiving a PAC donation. Since we have multiple observations for many of the legislators across Congressional sessions, we estimate models with standard errors robust to clustering on individual Congressperson. Though the mean on the dependent measure is below 0.20 (the typical cut-off for using linear probability models), we present LPMs anyway since we want the ease of coefficient comparison to the IV models, where it is necessary (despite the non-normal distribution) to use LPM when we have an endogenous dichotomous regressor and a dichotomous left-hand side variable (see Heckman and Macurdy, 1985) . That said, if we run these models using logistic regression, the same pattern of results emerges. In Table 5 we show the second stage results of our IV regression in which we use a linear probability model and the instrumented value of NARAL score (or one of the two dichotomous measures of NARAL rating) to predict the likelihood that a legislator received contributions from NARAL Pro-Choice America.
11 As shown in the first column, we find that when we instrument a perfect NARAL score, this variable is highly significant in the second stage predicting receipt of a NARAL donation, and, in fact, the parameter estimate is larger than the naïve OLS estimate, though a Hausman (1978) test shows that they are not significantly different from each other. 12 The probability of receiving a contribution from this PAC increases by 78.3% when a legislator's voting record moves from a non-perfect to a perfect score as rated by NARAL (in contrast to a 44.8% estimated increase in the naïve model). When we operationalize the NARAL score indicator contrasting those with a zero rating versus everyone else, we find that this specification does not yield a significant result. However, when we instrument the raw NARAL score, we again find that it is significant in predicting the likelihood of receiving a donation such that each additional point results in just under a onepercent increase in the probability of receiving a donation from this PAC. (Again, this point estimate is twice as big as the naïve estimate; however a Hausman test is unable to declare them statistically different, as a result of the large standard errors that IV regressions typically produce.) In the first stage of our 2SLS estimation (not shown), we find that proportion daughters has a significant and positive effect on a legislator's NARAL ProChoice America score, net of a legislator's age, religion, and political affiliation. The positive association between proportion of daughters and legislator's NARAL score is significant at the .001 level, and has an association of nearly 10 points on the raw score. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the proportion of daughters has an effect on voting behavior, net of other individual characteristics. In each of the specifications, we find that the instrumentproportion daughters-passes the F-test for strong instruments with an improvement to the base model of greater than 10 at one degree of freedom. 12 To extend our analysis, we also estimated a second stage modeling the effect of a legislator's instrumented score on the amount received, conditional on receiving any contribution from NARAL. (Table not shown; available from authors upon request.) We find that, conditional on having received money from NARAL, the relationship between NARAL score and PAC contributions is not significant. However, we suspect that the small sample size resulting from subsetting our data is driving the non-significant results. Given the problematic nature of the small sample size (n = 231), we do not draw any conclusions from this exercise.
Discussion and conclusions
The relationship between voting behavior and political contributions remains a central puzzle in the American political system. Research attempting to disentangle the effects of money in the political process has pointed the causal arrow from contributions to behavior, asking whether contributions from Political Action Committees affect the voting patterns of legislators. Much of the evidence suggests that the high correlation between voting behavior and campaign contributions does not result from an attempt by PACs to 'buy' votes.
In this paper, we explore an alternative perspective on money and politics, making three unique contributions. First, flipping the causal arrow, we ask whether voting behavior determines political contributions and, if so, what is the strength of that relationship. In the realm of reproductive rights, the evidence presented in this paper lends credibility to the hypothesis that a legislator's voting behavior affects contributions received from Political Action Committees in subsequent election cycles. Second, we build upon previous methodological work by employing a truly exogenous instrument to predict legislative scores. Using exogenous variation in the sex mix of a legislator's children, we employ a two stage least squares estimation procedure to measure the impact of voting behavior on political donations. Consistent with research by Washington (2008) , we find that the proportion daughters has a significant effect on a legislator's voting behavior with regard to women's issues, as measured by NARAL Pro-Choice America scores compiled in their ''Congressional Record on Choice.'' In the second stage of our analysis, we find a positive association between NARAL score (whether specified linearly or as an indicator of a ''perfect'' 100 point rating) and the likelihood of receiving a NARAL PAC contribution, suggesting that voting behavior may largely determine political contributions (at least in this highly visible policy domain). When we compare this estimate using exogenous variation in voting patterns to the ''naïve'' estimate that merely deploys observed voting score in a OLS linear probability model, we find that the two parameter estimates are not significantly different, suggesting that the observed relationship may be one of reward and not bribery-at least for this PAC on this issue. However, this is only a tentative proposition, since to fully explicate the bi-directional relationship implied in the association, we would need an additional instrument for donations in order to identify a full 2SLS structural equation model.
Finally, we open up a new issue domain for future research on the relationship between political contributions and voting behavior. Ours is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study to quantitatively examine the impact of voting behavior on political contributions in the realm of reproductive rights using an exogenous instrument for voting behavior.
While our evidence tentatively moves away from a 'vote buying' hypothesis towards a system of 'rewards', we are careful in extrapolating our results beyond the particular policy domain identified in this analysis. Reproductive rights represent a unique, ideologically-charged policy domain, and the ex ante commitment of legislators to particular political positions is, we suspect, quite strong. The 'rewards' system identified here might be particularly strong for ideologically charged issues where the possibility of position shifting from 'vote buying' is improbable. In low-visibility, low-impact issues, the possibility of a 'vote buying' system may be more plausible, and could be empirically tested through a similar estimation procedure. We recognize, too, the possibility that the unusually high-visibility of reproductive-related issues might force choice-related PACs to be more conservative in dolling out rewards, given the increased scrutiny they endure. Regardless of the direction of the causal arrow, if public perception of high visibility issues suggests that Political Action Committees are using money to 'buy votes,' then Political Action Committees might respond to this increased public scrutiny by tempering their contributions. In this scenario, PACs advocating for ideological, high-visibility issues may be rewarding legislators less than those engaged in low-visibility issues. Not needing to respond to public scrutiny, low-visibility PACs may, in fact, be the most engaged in this system of rewards.
Our analysis is not intended to suggest that Political Action Committees do not influence the behavior of legislators. There are, of course, other ways in which Political Action Committees sway individual legislators' voting behavior, or shape legislation earlier in the legislative process. They may apply pressure in committees, or use their prowess to affect the content of legislation. Our analysis speaks only to the direct impact of political contributions from Political Action Committees to legislators, not to a host of alternative mechanisms through which Political Action Committees exercise their political clout. Instead, it attempts to unravel the age-old political question about the relationship between political contributions and voting behavior. The analysis is similarly limited in disentangling the relationship between voting behavior and other sources of political contributions, like individual donors, labor unions, or corporations. Political Action Committees are unique insofar as they attempt to influence policy on a particular, well-defined subset of political issues (e.g. women's issues). The relationship between individual contributions, corporate contributions or those made by labor unions may be more difficult to disentangle, as the measurable outcomes are not as straightforward as those presented in this analysis. Nonetheless, future analysis should look towards exploring the important relationship between voting behavior and individual donors, corporate contributions and labor unions. Despite these limitations, the current paper offers some comfort to careful political observers that ours may not be, after all, a system of bribery-at least for this issue of major public concern.
